Major changes in visa and immigration policy have shaken the world of international recruitment in the past 18 months. Many universities have complained that even when the direction of policy is clear the detail and potential severity is uncertain. For the major pathway operators whose business model is almost wholly based on international recruitment it’s like dancing in the dark in a room full of sharp edges.
This blog focuses on data provided by accounts filed by INTO University Partnerships (INTO) for its UK pathway operations which offer a consistent insight into enrollment numbers at each location over time. Along with reasonable insights from its US partners these offer a good sense of how the world is treating international pathway operators in two major markets. If time allows I’ll be having a deeper dive into other operators – there are some emerging signs of stress.
Dancing with Myself
INTO measures itself on five key metrics in its annual Accounts. It’s appropriate for readers to familiarize themselves with what adjustments are being made to understand the full picture but at face value a six-year summary suggests only a slow recovery after the interruption of Covid. The cash figure (shown on a separate axis) suggests that operations are still needing support.

INTO’s turnover by region reflects longer-term struggles in the US compared to the UK. The single partnership in Australia, signed with G8 member the University of Western Australia in 2021, is showing early growth but is not a joint venture. With the recently re-elected Labour Government in Australia expected to implement “..fee hikes and stricter processes” and changes already implemented in 2024 “starting to slow” international student growth it is one to watch.

Source: INTO University Partnerships Company Accounts. (NB: Excludes statutory turnover and share of joint ventures’ turnover)
Quick Quick Slow in UK?
After the hurry-scurry to sign up partners up until around 2014 there has been a slow decline in the 50-50, deeply embedded joint venture model championed by INTO. Several have closed – including at the universities of Gloucestershire, St Georges, Glasgow Caledonian as well as Newcastle London and UEA London – and INTO now has the controlling interesting in the INTO Newcastle University venture. The situation at INTO City is more complex with both INTO and City University holding equal voting rights but the University only being entitled to 15% share of any profit.
All that being said, the UK-based ventures still reporting publicly in 2024 show that post pandemic recovery is slow and enrollments are well below the 2019 and 2020 numbers. We know with reasonable certainty that UK universities have had a difficult international enrollment cycle in 2024/25 so there may not be much good news even with universities where direct enrollment is allowed. Over and above that the Labour government does not appear to be letting up on dampening international student growth.
Of the entities shown below INTO had outstanding, interest-bearing loans to INTO UEA, INTO Queen’s and INTO Stirling totalling £7.65m. Until the 2021/2022 accounts INTO indicated these inter-company arrangements with joint ventures as them being either a debtor or creditor. In 2018/19 the three were debtors to the tune of £3.97m.

Source: Joint Venture Accounts
It’s not all gloom and doom though. INTO has two wholly owned pathway operations in the UK and the Manchester venue has boomed since 2021 while the London World Education Centre has returned to 2020 levels. It will be interesting to see whether the Manchester operation is affected after losing Manchester Metropolitan University as a partner to Navitas ahead of recruitment for 2025/26. Another one to wait and watch on is the 100% owned operation in collaboration with Lancaster University – it reported an operating loss of £2.6m in 2023/24 ahead of the “first main cohort” joining in September 2024.

Source: Company Accounts
Last Waltz in the US?
INTO burst onto the US scene with seven university partners and a US private equity partner investing £66m for a 25% stake between 2008 and 2015 but then found itself being surpassed as an operator by Shorelight. INTO peaked with 12 partners in 2018 (although Hofstra has never been listed as a joint venture in INTO’s annual report) of which five pathways are now shuttered and two, at St Louis University and Suffolk University, have become wholly owned. The pivot to direct recruitment sees 22 US options listed on its website compared to over 100 for Shorelight.
My blog reviewing enrollments in Fall 2024 at Oregon State University, St Louis University, George Mason University and University of Alabama – Birmingham, showed that only UAB was making any real headway on international student recruitment. The four ventures all have interest bearing loans from INTO and these appear to have receded to pre-COVID levels.

Source: INTO University Partnerships Financial Reports (NB: INTO’s classification of the year-end financial relationship with joint ventures changed in 2022/23 to show loans where previously the term debtors had been used.)
Since the blog noted above, I have been able to find enrollment data for Drew University whose joint venture partnership with INTO began in 2015. After solid numbers above 100 from 2016 to 2020 there has been a steep decline in enrollments.

Source: Drew University Consolidated Financial Report (students as at June of the year)
Casting a further shadow over the US operation is the litigation with the University of South Florida which has continued into a third year. The bill “in respect of disputes” noted in INTO’s accounts has risen from £550k in 2021/22 to £2.1m in 2023/24. It may not all be related to the USF case but this seems likely to be a major driver.
To outline the current state of the case is well beyond the scope of this blog. Some features would be that both sides are currently arguing over the validity of the reports made by each other’s expert witnesses and one element of the case has been appealed to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District (Case Number: 2D2025-0798). As far as I have been able to follow, the trial remains set for August 2025 but there is a pre-trial conference in July and before that there is a meeting where one item is to “Discuss the possibility of settlement”.
My last major update on the case was in June 2024. At that point the suggestion of $71.6m in damages being claimed in damages by INTO gave some sense of what was at stake. It remains to be seen how this plays out.
Image by Colin Behrens from Pixabay
























