INTO – View From A Bridge – management, education and personal thoughts

INTO THE GREAT WIDE OPEN*

It’s always difficult to know when news is official and when it’s a false start and a case in point is the appearance then disappearance of a new Chief Executive Officer for INTO University Partnerships (INTO) over the course of a few days last week. It would be invidious to name names publicly at this point but one day the INTO corporate website had a picture and biography then a day later it was gone. It all happened so quickly that I was pleased to have a conversation with a colleague who had seen the website and could also name the individual.

There doesn’t appear to have been a press announcement about the appointment, but on Wednesday 16 June, the site also had INTO’s co-founder John Sykes listed as Deputy Chief Executive and VP of UK Operations so there seemed to be a nascent structure in place. More curious is that all of INTO’s pages related to people – and they were extensive – went missing and remain so on Wednesday 23 June. If you click on the link to Our People it takes you to a bland page about Global Reach – Global Impact, the Leadership Team area on Corporate Information is a desert and the Meet Our North American Development Team section is as blank as untrodden snow.

Any official and authoritative explanation is welcome and I’m happy to provide an update if it is forthcoming. Perhaps the wider site needed a major refreshing but if so it would be reasonable to see the Marshall Student Center and Colorado State University imagery coming down because those joint ventures have closed. Anyone who has had responsibility for keeping websites up to date know that it is not for the faint-hearted and requires constant vigilance. Using collateral from partnerships that have ended feels a little like the corporate equivalent of carrying a torch for a childhood sweetheart.

The claim of 30 university partnerships in the UK and US also does not square with the logos of nine US partners and nine UK partners. The relationship with Chinese universities appears to have disappeared from the corporate site but the INTO student site still has opportunities for study at Nankai University. It’s all pretty confusing.

Only time will tell if the lack of information about leadership reflects a new approach to privacy, a major update or a pending restructure of significant proportions but it’s a good moment to review the task facing a new CEO if or when they are appointed. Partnership growth has stalled, online capability appears to be behind the curve and the main competition has forged ahead in both areas. It seems a long way from the growth proposition that encouraged Leeds Equity Partners to invest £66m ($105.8m) for a 25% stake in the business back in 2013.

Over the past two years INTO has seen the end of joint ventures at the University of Gloucestershire, Newcastle University London and Glasgow Caledonian University in the UK as well as Marshall University, Colorado State University and Washington State University in the USA. The company invested in School Apply in early 2020 and closed it a year or so later.

The INTO Annual Report for the year ended 31 July 2020 was for a year before the full impact of the pandemic was felt on 2020/21 enrolments and suggested little growth. Adjusted turnover (which removes discontinued operations) was up 3% to £202k while adjusted EBITDA fell 9.1% to £26m. Overall, the intercompany debt from joint ventures to INTO had increased by around £8m to £44m with the Centre’s closing listed as debtors to the tune of around £11m.

After entering the pathway market with a ground-breaking joint-venture model at the University of East Anglia in 2006, INTO leveraged its model with great initial success in the US at Oregon State University from 2008. There have been no new partners in the UK since the University of Stirling in 2014 and the most recent pathway additions in the US was Hofstra University announced in January 2019. Shorelight adopted many aspects of the INTO model and has forged ahead to be the dominant partner of American universities since its founding in 2013. Long-term players like Kaplan, CEG, Navitas and Study Group and upstarts like QA Higher Education and Oxford International have scooped up the most recent UK university pathway partnerships.

INTO’s purchase of SchoolApply may have been the start of a foray into the world of online delivery but it is no longer active and there is little evidence of significant advances in this area. This is at a point where Study Group is moving forward with Insendi, Kaplan Open Learning has online partnerships with Essex and Liverpool, CEG Digital has an established stable of partners and even Oxford International has been making waves with its Digital Institute. In the US, Shorelight has made a great deal of its delivery through the Shorelight Live platform and appears to be repositioning as a business delivering technological solutions to student problems.

One way of looking at things might be to suggest that the reduction in partnerships has been a deliberate step by INTO to clean up some joint ventures that had struggled to make headway in a competitive market. The growing level of indebtedness from these joint ventures to INTO might suggest that they were not making adequate progress but it does seem as if several decisions were university driven. The latest closures are part of history that includes the closures of partnerships with St George’s, University of London, and UEA London which undermines the original notion of long-term joint ventures providing greater stability than third-party pathway providers.

It’s something of a strategic head-scratcher and the loss of academic ‘supply’ comes at a tipping point where both the US and UK are demonstrably back in the game as far as international student demand is concerned. The lack of a viable online option seems to put INTO at a disadvantage in delivering to a market where increased flexibility and option has become the norm and is likely to grow in future years.

Perhaps there is a mega-deal on its way and one might guess that Leeds Equity Partner would be pleased to find a way to realise some return after eight years of a holding position. A possible merger with Shorelight to become a demonstrable lead player in the US seems a long shot but the operating models have some similarities and the online expertise may bring energy to INTO’s portfolio. Or maybe this is the moment where a stable group generating solid if unspectacular EBITDA could be taken back into 100% ownership by INTO’s founder, Andrew Colin.

It’s all speculation but for an outside observer INTO needs to establish some renewed momentum if it is to fulfil the promise of its early days of innovation, creativity and energy. There’s been substantial investment in talent at the top level and perhaps a new CEO is the final piece in the jigsaw. Only time will tell.

Image by Anemone123 from Pixabay

* Fans of the mighty Tom Petty will know that Into The Great Wide Open is co-written with Jeff Lynne and charts the progress of Eddie as he “went to Hollywood, got a tattoo”, “made a record and it went in the charts” to the time “their A&R man said, ‘I don’t hear a single”. It’s the old story of “rebel without a clue”, to overnight success, to uncertainty when “the future was wide open”.

Amendment on 1 May 2023: The earlier version of this blog suggested that Andrew Colin, founder of INTO, might take the business “private”. It has been amended to clarify that this was intended to suggest he might choose to take it 100% back into his sole ownership

PIGS TO PETTICOATS TO PATHWAY PROBLEMS

INTO’s London-based joint venture with Newcastle University is the second of the pathway provider’s high profile university partnerships to come to grief at the Middlesex Street building near Liverpool Street station. The location was also the home of INTO’s venture with the ill-fated London Academy of Diplomacy, led by Joseph Mifsud who became infamous for his involvement in Robert Mueller’s enquiry into President Trump. It’s reasonable to say that the site has seen more than its fair share of false starts, big ambitions and strange bedfellows – there’s even a Princess at one point.

The timeline of occupants, the financial fortunes of the joint ventures and the variety of pre-university, undergraduate and master’s courses offered suggests that making a success of a London venture is tricky. There are many potential downsides to higher education investment in one of the most expensive cities in the world. When ambience fall short of a true campus experience, facilities are limited and university faculty are more committed to their home towns it can be particularly hard going.

A run through the various occupants of Middlesex shows that even well ranked partners with global reputations might find it too difficult or too expensive to make things work. The dates of operation are taken from public documents but may reflect a difference between an entity being incorporated and its first intake. Any authoritative updates are welcome.

INTO University of East Anglia, London (2009-2014)

INTO UEA (London Campus) LLP was established as a joint venture in 2009 to provide academic and language courses, primarily to international students, at a purpose built study centre in London. The intention was to offer pre-university courses along with “graduate and post-graduate courses taught by UEA academics”. But UEA’s 2011/12 Financial Statement suggested that things were not going to plan and noted, “Trading to date is slightly down on the original plan, reflecting a slower build up in student numbers than originally anticipated.”

The University’s 2012/13 Annual Report comments, “In light of the current trading performance of INTO London, and the fact that accumulated losses will not be recouped for some time, the University made a capital investment of £3,000,000 in the joint venture in August 2013.” An operating loss of £1.2m in 2011/12 had followed one of £2.5m in 2010/11 for the joint venture. By early 2014 UEA had decided to retire at the end of July 2014 to focus on delivering teaching and research, “at our superb Norwich campus,”.

INTO City, University of London (2010-Current)

INTO City began trading in 2010 and focuses on pre-university courses. By 2015 the joint venture had net current liabilities of £5.8m and its annual report noted “material uncertainty which may cast significant doubt upon the LLP’s ability to continue as a going concern.” Discussions were ongoing to reduce the charges from each partner, clarify governance and recapitalize the venture.

The outcomes suggest a rebalancing of risk and reward reflected in City’s 2018/19 Financial Statements which note that, “Prior to 1 September 2017, a 50 per cent share of the net assets and liabilities was included in City’s balance sheet and 50 per cent of its net income was reported in the consolidated income and expenditure account. Since 1 September 2017, City’s share of net income has been reduced to 15 percent.” Always worth remembering that universities are primarily interested in pathway providers because of the income they receive from students who progress to full degree courses. This may be a reason that City gives equal prominence on its webpages to the pathway arrangement with Kaplan International College

London Academy of Diplomacy (2010-2016)

In an impassioned blog in 2013, UEA visiting lecturer Barry Tomalin advocated, “Don’t Let Diplomacy Fail”, to students at INTO’s London Academy of Diplomacy (known affectionately as “LAD”). Under Professor Nabil Ayad, LAD had been with the University of Westminster, but from 2010 its degrees were validated by UEA and it operated out of Middlesex Street. Another INTO partner, the University of Stirling, took over validating the Academy’s awards in 2014 by which time Professor Joseph Mifsud was Director of LAD.

Brig Newspaper does a decent job of explaining the story of the “academic who attempted to connect the Trump campaign with Vladimir Putin” and INTO’s role with the Academy. It highlights that LAD was closed in 2016 “citing financial difficulties” and an article in the Diplomat suggest that the Academy had 150 students in 2014. Sufficient to say that the University of Stirling’s London-based activities arising from its joint-venture with INTO, whether with LAD or the short-lived Master’s program at a different site in the capital, no longer exist.

INTO Newcastle University London (2015-2021)

The Newcastle University London joint venture had an inaugural intake in 2015 and offered both pathway and degree courses. Opened by HRH Princess Eugenie, a Newcastle graduate, in October 2015, it held the university’s aspirations that, ”..in collaboration with INTO, our London campus is expected to grow to 1,200 students.” By 2018/19 the venture had grown to 504 enrollments but its operating losses had reached £2.4m.

Council minutes from the University indicate that discussions and negotiations about the future of the joint venture had been ongoing during most of 2019. By April 2020 the University’s Council noted “that there was a compelling case to suspend undergraduate recruitment in 2020 on the grounds of insufficient applications, and judged that the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic would make future viability even less likely.” It seemed a short step from there to the recent announcement that the joint venture would close next year.

INTO London World Education Center (“WEC”) (2017-Current)

WEC is a wholly owned operation of INTO’s which began operations around 2012/13 and offers pre-university courses for international students. The student outcomes are accepted for consideration for entry by over 100 UK universities. The accounts for 2015/16 noted an expected move to Middlesex Street which would “represent a more desirable study location” than its previous home on Mile End Road but this appears to have been delayed until 2017/18.

Year one at the new location saw a rise from 123 to 157 students but 2018/19 saw a decline back to 126. WEC’s operating loss grew from £1.9m to £2.4m year-on-year across the two periods. WEC’s debt to other INTO group undertakings also appears to have risen to £8.9m in 2019 from £5.6m in 2015.

London – A Golden Opportunity or a Battle for Survival?

The chequered history of the Middlesex Street pathway operation matches the shifting sands of the location. The Street was known as Hogge Lane in the Middle Ages because pigs were fattened up in the surrounding fields to feed Londoners. Ryther’s famous map of 1608 records a name change, with Hogge Lane becoming Peticote Lane (with the spelling later being standardised to ”Petticoat”) as the area had become known for merchants’ selling second-hand clothes. Petticoat Lane Market became one of the most famous in London, but around 1830 prudish authorities thought it unseemly to have a thoroughfare named after an item of women’s underwear and it was renamed Middlesex Street.

Shakespeare is quoted as saying, “I hope to see London ere I die” and many universities and pathway operators have set their sights on the UK capital in the belief it is an irresistible magnet to international students. And Benjamin Disraeli, twice British prime minister in the 1800s, said “London is a modern Babylon” which suggests its history as an appropriate location for language-oriented pathways. It is certainly possible to see pathway successes in London, with an example being the Kaplan International Centre which continues to add to an illustrious list of partner institutions.

But with the fallout from Brexit, the potential resurgence of a more friendly US international student experience, and all the uncertainties of a post-pandemic world the future for London-based education is far from clear. Expensive buildings and accommodation, limited commitment from faculty to travel to London and low progression rates from a London pathway course to a distant campus are all obstacles to be overcome. It could be that legendary punk group The Ruts summed up the future for investors best when they sang, “Babylon’s burning with anxiety”.

NOTES

1. Information relating to joint venture finances is taken from the filings at Companies House (INTO UEA (London Campus) LLP (now INTO London Mdx Street LLP, INTO City LLP, Newcastle University INTO London LLP, and INTO London World Education Centre Limited.

2. Commentary on the ventures at Middlesex Street has been taken from official records but it is a complex history. Any corrections, insights or updates from sources that can be validated are welcome. They will be noted and credited on this blog.

Image by TeeFarm from Pixabay

US University Pathways – Build It And They Will Come?

In 2014 Karen Khemka, a partner with the Parthenon Group, said “The U.S. third-party/outsourced pathway market is less than half the size of the Australian market despite having a higher education system that is 10 times the size.We anticipate that growth will be constrained only by the pace at which private providers can develop the market.” (Inside Higher Education, Bridge or Back Door? 30 April, 2014). With reports recently indicating that two leading providers in the US, Study Group and INTO, are for sale it’s a good moment to see what has happened.

Khemka’s statement came towards the tail end of a period when more than a billion dollars was invested in private pathway providers with the potential for pathway development in the US a strong incentive. But the next billion-dollar question facing potential investors may be whether US pathways were really a field of dreams where you could, to borrow loosely from the film, ‘build it and they will come’. Or has attention to the supply side of the equation ignored the challenges of changing patterns of demand around the world?

To size the growth in capacity in the US I took the NAFSA publication Landscape of Third-Party Pathway Partnerships in the United States (NAFSA, 2017) as a starting point. The publication identified eight providers who were partnering with 45 institutions on 1 April 2016. The criteria was that these partnerships had to be ‘contractual agreements between universities and third-party entities to provide English language courses along with academic credit.’

I revisited each of the third-party entities listed to determine what relationships they have added. It is reasonable to say that the wording of some media statements and the content of web-sites is, either by accident or design, unclear about the exact nature of the relationship or offering. However, Table 1 summarises my understanding of new partnerships that meet the original criteria and notes the dates they were announced.

Table 1 – New US Pathways of Eight Providers Announced 2016 to 2018

* Source: Landscape of Third-Party Pathway Partnerships in the United States (NAFSA, 2017)
**I can find no public announcement of the Shorelight partnership with Utah but it is reflected on the web-site of each organisation

Table 2 shows arrangements listed on the providers’ websites but which I have omitted. I am happy to accept any authoritative corrections in my understanding of the nature of the partnerships or courses provided and to add any partners I have missed. I have not gone beyond the original group of providers although a number of additional providers, such as EC Higher Education, have also developed pathway courses in recent years.

Table 2 – Partnerships listed on provider websites but not meeting criteria

The eight providers have added 21 new partnerships to the 45 shown in the original study – a growth of 47%. This suggests that the private providers have set about growing their businesses in the US with a good deal of vigour and some degree of success. At the time of Khemka’s quote in 2014 Shorelight was a new player but they have moved on to secure the most partnerships just four years later.

That growth in pathway capacity comes at a time when the global balance between supply and demand is in a state of flux and the future is somewhat less certain. The expanding availability of degrees taught in English and the ambitious targets of both traditional recruiting countries and emerging destinations has radically changed the competitive environment. While much of the world is adding rocket fuel to its recruiting engines the US looks to have loaded its unleaded petrol engine with diesel.

In the US a decline in non-degree new enrolments in 2015/16 was followed a year later by both graduate and undergraduate new enrolments declining. And non-degree enrolments continued to fall in 2016/17 which may be a leading edge indicator of further decline. The IEE Fall 2017 International Student Enrollment Hot Topics Survey says ‘Responding institutions report a 6.9 percent decline of international students enrolling for the first time at a U.S. institution, continuing the declines first seen in Fall 2016.’ (IEE, November 2017)

Table 3 – US New International Student Enrollment, 2006/07-2016/17
Source: Institute of International Education (2017). Open Doors Report on International Education Exchange. Retrieved from http://www.iee.org/opendoors

Like many sectors higher education is being obliged to rethink the fundamentals of supply and demand as demographics, competition and disruptive technologies undermine the old certainties. It is a challenging moment to be launching new initiatives and building capacity based on past performance.

NOTES AND CORRECTIONS

This post was updated on 24 September 2017 to include Lynn University as a Study Group partner announced in May 2017. Other related statistics have been updated. At the time of announcement it was billed as ‘is set to open in January’ – presumably 2018. As of the date of this correction the partner is billed on the Study Group site as ‘Launching Soon’.

PATHWAY, DEAD END OR TIME FOR A U-TURN?

August 2018 will be the fifth anniversary of Shorelight’s first partner, Bath Spa University in the UK, being announced with suggestions that the university would ‘see its overseas intake swell to around 2,000 students over the next four years.’. The four years would run from 2015/16 to 2018/19.

It seemed a good moment to look at the pathway market and what happens when relationships don’t work out. This is partly because we may be entering a period where the pathway sector has matured and circumstances make it ripe for realignment. The stakes are high on all sides and the factors are particularly relevant to the UK and US where growth in pathways has been rapid and international student recruitment has been under substantial pressure.

As finances tighten university management is under more scrutiny and is likely to demand more in terms of targets and delivery from partners. The consequences of a failing pathway are becoming increasingly difficult to hide as direct recruitment gets harder. Providers have their own problems with unprecedented global pressures and ubiquitous competition. Some may be reaching a point where optimising their portfolio is more important than simply adding or maintaining capacity.

In the UK a number of institutions have been following the University of Sheffield to see how the switch from one major private provider to another might work. Loyalties are under pressure as university leaders who signed the deal move on and some pathway providers look to change hands after the glut of private equity investment from 2010 to 2014. Pressure to perform has never been greater.

So, when a pathway becomes a dead-end there is every incentive for one or other party to make a U-turn. Or, as Warren Buffett is quoted as saying, “Should you find yourself in a chronically leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be a more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.” And it doesn’t really matter if it’s a long-term contract (where remedies for under-performance are usually written in) or time for a tender after five years.

IT HASN’T ALWAYS ENDED WELL IN THE PAST
There is, of course, precedent and although closures can be hard to trace I have listed below those that I have uncovered in my research. New partnerships are usually heralded with a fanfare and people smiling as they shake hands on a deal done. Unsurprisingly, a veil is drawn over partnerships that end and those that are public are usually dressed in anodyne media responses.

For both universities and providers that is unfortunate. Considering and addressing failure is a good way of learning and often more informative than the bright, shiny case studies which are so popular as sales tools. In my time with two leading universities with private providers and as COO and CEO with two providers I saw many factors that can make or break a partnership. These are worth sharing.

I make no comment on the reasons for the ending of the relationships noted (but have referenced reports where available). Neither do I claim that this list is exhaustive and I would be interested in any other examples. For organisations contemplating partnerships an open and honest discussion with those who have tried and moved on is probably worth as much as hours of expensive contract development.

Study Group
i) Stirling University (Opened 2007- Closed 2013) Source: QAA

INTO
i) University of East Anglia London (2010-2014) Source: THE) ii) University of Stirling London (Opened 2014 – Closed 2015?) iii) St George’s University (Opened 2012 – closed 2017 Source: St George’s University Annual Report

Oxford International
i) Canterbury Christchurch (Opened 2015 – closed 2017?)

Kaplan
i) University of Utah (Opened 2010 – Closed?) ii)University of Sheffield (Opened 2006 – Closed 2015)

Navitas
i) Western Kentucky University (Opened 2010 – Closed 2016)
ii) Edinburgh Napier (Opened 2011 – due to close 2018)

PRIVATE PATHWAYS MAY NOT BE ACCESSIBLE OR GUARANTEE SUCCESS
UK universities with the greatest decline in overall international enrolments in the past five years often have no pathway partner or are relatively late to the party. Several of the non-aligned universities here have been actively seeking providers but there is, inevitably, caution from providers about taking on institutions that do not have underlying strength.

It remains to be seen whether some of the new partnerships can materially alter the trajectory of underperforming universities. Sector sources suggest that Oxford International and the University of Bedfordshire are parting company and the provider is not currently listing this university on its website.

Table 1 – UK Universities With Greatest Decline In International Enrolments 2012/13 to 2016/17

Source: HESA (enrolments), QAA and University/Company websites

And that brings me full circle to Bath Spa and Shorelight. HESA data (supported by the University’s Annual Report narrative) showed strong growth in international recruitment from 2012/13 to 2014/15. In the first full year of the partnership with Shorelight (2015/16) there was a weakening of growth which was followed by declining international enrolments in 2016/17. There is some way to go for the university to reach the anticipated 2,000 by 2018/19.

Table 2 – Bath Spa University International Enrolments 2012-13 to 2016/17

Source: HESA

Perhaps more troubling is that in December 2017 the THE reported that ‘figures available on (sic) Companies House show that Bath Spa Global – an international pathway college venture set up in 2014 in partnership with US firm Shorelight Education – has lost about £1.4 million in the three years to July 2016, while its parent company Bath Spa U has lost about £736,000 over the same period.’. The 2016/17 Financial Statement from Bath Spa showed international student income and numbers declining year on year and noted that the joint venture partnership, Bath Spa Global, ‘remains fragile’. At the time of writing I can find no mention of Bath Spa University on Shorelight’s web-site and no current reference to Shorelight on the University’s site.