Month: August 2022

INTO Court as Joint Venture Sours

There are signs that INTO University Partnerships’ (INTO) relationship with the University of South Florida may be ending after a recent Court Evidentiary Hearing1 on 19 August 2022.  While no public record of a judgement has appeared, rumors suggest there are communications in circulation advising that enrollment to INTO University of South Florida (INTO USF) will cease.  If any authoritative source can provide an alternative explanation or clarification, I will be happy to correct any misunderstandings.

It is appropriate to note that both INTO and the University of South Florida still feature INTO University of South Florida on their websites at the time of writing (27 August). The INTO Study site for students also offers the opportunity to apply for courses at the university. This may be the result of a time lag or the possibility of further discussion and this blog is written in good faith to explore the background to the Court case and the joint venture’s history.

The underlying case for a university going to court to end a joint-venture pathway that was once among the most successful in the world deserves attention.  Publicly available court filings outline the case2 and material on the INTO Corporate and University of South Florida websites is used to summarize the history and other background about the joint venture relationship.  The source of further commentary is referenced through hyperlinks.  

Summary of the Case

A Court filing3 from USF Financing Corporation (USFFC) to the Thirteenth Judicial Court in and for the state of Florida Civil Division dated 15 July 2022 seeks a “declaratory judgment that the 2010 stockholders Agreement between USF FC, the Company4, and the INTO Defendants is terminated as of April 21, 2022.” The grounds are that the joint venture is “insolvent under both a balance sheet basis and inability to pay debts as they become due, and (b) has demonstrated a material adverse financial position where it could not perform all or a substantial part of its obligations..”.  The particular difficulties of pathway programs in the United States have been widely explored and the filing incorporates direct reference to my blog of February 2022 regarding the growing level of indebtedness of INTO’s US ventures.

With an eye on its responsibilities for “stewardship of public resources” the University of South Florida terminated the program in April 2022 and “initiated the process for the teach-out of the programs’ enrolled international students….”  The filing asserts that “The INTO defendants refuse to acknowledge the Stockholders Agreement termination and refuse to participate in the teach-out or develop the Plan to dissolve and wind-up the Company.”  There are a number of points made around the fiduciary duty of the three INTO appointed Directors of INTO USF Inc, to creditors and shareholders “once a company is insolvent” with a memo, the accompanying Exhibit G of the filing, asserting that “the INTO appointed directors have a conflict of interest.”

INTO University of South Florida

INTO partnered with the University of South Florida in 2010 and the case study on the INTO website asserts “extraordinary” enrollment and economic impacts.  The accompanying graph (reproduced below) suggests that even if this was true up until 2016/17 the ensuing years have seen a significant decline in enrollment to the pathway.  Enrollments look to have peaked at around 800 but have subsequently fallen by around 100 a year to stand at c300 (this would be supported by the USF Fact Books showing non-degree seeking international students declining by a similar amount).

Source: INTO Global.com

The Court filing includes INTO USF, Inc’s Financial Statement to June 30, 2021 (Exhibit E) showing a net loss of $3.276m that year and $206,000 the year before.  This is supported by the USFFC’s Financial Statements to 30 June 2021 which comment on “approximately $3.3 million of net loss incurred by INTO USF during the year ended June 30, 2021.”  USFFC’s share of INTO USF’s “net accumulated (deficit)” was shown as $1.794m.

As noted in the February 2022 blog “China Crisis for US Pathways”, since 2018 when INTO Illinois State University opened, “total level of indebtedness across all US operations has nearly doubled from £18m to £35m”.  This figure included the debts at institutions where joint ventures have now closed – Washington State University, Marshall University and Colorado State University.  The blog also reflects that INTO has become the 100% owner of what was previously a joint venture at St Louis University.

One feature of both INTO USF (the second INTO partnership in the US) and INTO Oregon State University (the first) is that they are listed in INTO’s Annual Report as Inc. and are C-corporations.  Informed opinion suggests that closely held corporations (which these appear to be) “have been held to higher fiduciary duty standards” and this may be reflected in the “conflict of interest” comment.  Later US joint ventures are listed as LLC’s where, “By agreement, parties can alter certain duties to expand, restrict, or eliminate fiduciary duties owing to either the LLC or the other members and managers”, which suggests there may have been advice leading INTO to pursue alternative structures.5

Summary

It is worth waiting to see any Court judgement and whether there is an appeal process but the filing and other financial statements seem definitive in outlining the decline of the joint-venture’s financial situation.  If the joint venture is closed it would leave INTO with six joint ventures in the US, as well as the fully owned St Louis University operation and the “comprehensive partnership” with Hofstra (which is not listed in INTO’s annual reports as having joint ownership). 

As well as the closures in the US there have been several INTO joint ventures shut down in the UK in recent years.  In addition, INTO has taken a controlling interest in the joint venture with Newcastle University and the financial arrangements at the joint venture with City University have changed.  As noted in a recent blog the yearly financial reporting for INTO University of East Anglia is shown at Companies House as overdue, for a joint venture under significant financial pressure.

On top of all that there are rumors of imminent changes at the top in the INTO Finance team and the return of a familiar face to the INTO North America team but that is for another day.

Notes

  1. Case number: 22-CA-006726 before Judge D.D. Farfante
  2. I am unaware of any written response by INTO University Partnerships to the case filed
  3. Filing#153460265 Efiled 07/15/2022 07:45:26 PM
  4. “the Company” is defined as INTO USF Inc which is the C-Corporation established in 2010 with stockholders USFFC and INTO USA LLC.  Its board has three nominees from INTO and three from USFFC.
  5. The purpose of this paragraph is to provide further information which may be relevant and the quoted elements comes from the source indicated.  There is no intention to give legal advice or guidance and readers are advised to seek appropriate counsel on company structures.

Image by Venita Oberholster from Pixabay 

UK International Undergraduates – a New Status Quo?

As university admissions colleagues in the UK wander off into the glow of a long Bank Holiday weekend (or perhaps not if you are still recruiting to fill seats) it’s worth updating an earlier blog on international fortunes in Clearing.  While Clearing will continue for another month the main action is in the opening week or so and the picture appears to have settled quite quickly.  Figures for acceptances are taken at Day 8 of Clearing (Friday 26 August) unless otherwise stated.

At the top level, the relative performance of EU applications/acceptances and those from other international markets means that total international acceptances are 12% of the total which is a percent up on 2021 but 2% down on 2020.  Newspaper stories expressing horror about one in five university places going to international students are far from the truth although there are, and have always been, universities with higher proportions.  It makes for a very dull graph but the balance may reflect a new status quo. 

European Union – Down Down Deeper and Down

Applications from Europe continue to decline and acceptance rates are down at 40.5% from 51.6% in 2020.  Fewer students, fewer good students and/or fewer students accepting offers are probably all in the mix.  It’s a potent brew with the only hope for the future being that the pace of decline has slowed year on year.

Perhaps most telling is that the decline is not only in the less economically well off EU countries such as Poland and Romania which drove so much growth in recent years.  Applications from Germany have fallen 43% since 2020 with acceptances down 54% and those from France are down 42% and 52% respectively.  The other European G7 economy is Italy where both applications and acceptances are down 53%.

Other International Applications Rocking All Over the World but Acceptance Trend is Patchy

It has been interesting to watch the Canadian visa system buckling under the weight of study applications and facing assertions of prejudice in decision making.  It seems likely that UK universities, in working hard to ensure that their visa record is not compromised, prevent the Home Office from facing such a stark situation.  Nonetheless, a situation where an increased pool of Chinese applicants is being accepted at a rate of 48.4% while those from Nigeria are at an historically low acceptance rate of 25.7% suggests something is not quite right.

Acceptance levels from India are also down on every year of the past decade and those from Pakistan well away from the peak in 2017.  While top line growth in applications may be a sign of popularity it should bring an obligation on any intermediaries – whether agents, pathways, aggregators or others – to be careful in those being put forward to university partners.  What is hidden even further in the undergrowth is the extent to which financially stretched institutions may be taking students who will struggle to last the course or secure the degree they are investing in.

Figures Can Mean Whatever You Want

Amid the triumphalism over achieving the Government’s international student target a decade early there was always a question about what happens next.  Performing well during a pandemic when most of the competition has closed its borders is a reasonable start but with the Australians roaring back and the US seeming less prone to self-inflicted injuries the UK may find headwinds developing.  The reality is that, counting European Union students, the UK is likely to recruit fewer international undergraduates in 2022 than in 2015 and that should not be seen as a success.

Notes

Just to confirm that the references to Status Quo songs in the sub-headings are intentional.   

Image by Arek Socha from Pixabay 

US International Enrollments See the Light But Pathway Struggle Continues

It’s always a delight when there is a shaft of light that gives an insight into important issues like international student enrollment.  George Mason University (GMU) has made available a day by day view of preliminary enrollments1 which offers a near real time picture of what is happening at the university and its pathway partnership with INTO University Partnerships (IUP),  INTO Mason.  It probably gives a reasonable indicator of how US institutions and their pathways are faring as the pandemic unwinds and follows data points in the early part of 2022 including:

  • IEE Spring 2022 Snapshot where 65% of 559 institutions responding reported “an increase in their international student applications for the 2022/23 academic year”
  • a Wall Street Journal report showing the number of F-1 visas issued to Chinese students  dropped in the first six months of 2022 to 31,055 compared to 64,261 issued in the first six months of 2019
  • The Siasat Daily and others report that between January and May 2022 US consulates issued nearly 15,000 “F1 or student visas” to students in India – triple the number issued in 2022

Visa delays are still an issue but things are moving.  The question is how much and what are the implications.  GMU’s contemporaneous data gives some directions of travel.  There is still some time to go before official census data and the data does not provide country by country insights but the transparency is welcome.

Source data for the graphs below is on the GMU Office of Institutional Effectiveness and Planning website.  The graphs combines information on preliminary enrollment data for 2022 with year-by-year data from the normal census point in October of previous years.    

INTO Mason Pathway Struggles to Recover

Recruitment to INTO Mason has been struggling for several years and had dropped, before the pandemic, by 35% from 371 in 2017 to 241 in 2019.  Numbers enrolled halved during the two years impacted by the pandemic.  In a year where recovery might be anticipated the enrollments of 117 for Fall 2022 remain below those Fall 2020, less than half of 2019 and even further down on 2018.2

While the GMU data does not allow an analyse of enrollments by country it seems plausible to believe that declines in students from China contributed significantly to performance pre-pandemic and there is little sign of recovery.  It also seems likely that any growth in students coming to the US is largely made up of graduates who do not require pathway courses.  This would be consistent with previous suggestions that the changing market dynamics are likely to undermine the core pathway business model.

Note: Filter used was Fall enrollments, INTO Mason, US campuses, all students (Preliminary data for 2022 taken at 22 August, 2022 – shown as First day of classes)

Accelerated Growth in Direct Graduate Enrollment at GMU

Direct enrollment to GMU has taken a significantly different course.  From 2021 to the preliminary numbers in 2022, graduate enrollment has surged by 46% from 1641 to 2397.  While UG enrollment is still below 2019 the graduate growth has boosted overall enrollment of non-resident aliens to a six-year high of 3844.

This suggests that the opportunity to recruit has come in countries, such as India, where the majority of students are seeking a graduate course.  GMU presents the overall enrollment data in a way which includes INTO Mason numbers but it is clear from the graph above that the pathway cannot be responsible for the growth in recruitment.  There is no indication of the extent, if any, to which IUP’s direct recruitment efforts for GMU have supported this growth.   

Note: Filter used was Fall enrollments, ALL GMU US Campuses, non-resident alien. (Preliminary data for 2022 taken at 22 August, 2022 – shown as First day of classes)

Pandemic Escalates Debt Levels at Joint Venture

Each year, in its published annual report, IUP records the level of debt it is owed by its joint ventures.  In a single year near peak enrollment the INTO Mason joint venture did not owe anything but since then the level of debt has escalated and the first two years of the pandemic saw a significant growth in indebtedness.  A previous blog has shown the growing level of indebtedness of all of IUP’s US joint ventures (including the three that have closed in recent years).

Source: INTO University Partnership Annual Reports

A recent report from an IUP university partner in the UK suggested that the decline in its joint venture with IUP was so significant that there “will be no distribution in respect of 2020/21 nor for the next three years whilst the joint venture recovers”.  At INTO Mason the level of indebtedness appears to have grown by £1.5m a year in each of the pandemic years and there is little to suggest that INTO Mason’s enrollments this year will grow above those in 2020.  IUP has they have the opportunity to offset any problems in pathway performance with direct recruitment revenue streams but the scale of the challenge seems clear.    

No Miraculous Recovery

As noted in a previous blog, the changing international student recruitment picture is likely to fundamentally change the way that pathway operators develop sustainable revenue streams.  In the US, Shorelight has acted quickly to develop a direct recruitment partners and has significantly outstripped IUP in this regard.  With recovery in the traditional core market of Chinese undergraduates looking sluggish and increasingly unlikely to ever reach the heights of the growth years the strategic challenge is very real for all concerned.

There has been a longer-term malaise around IUP with recent changes at Board level and a developing “boots on the ground” strategy suggesting a shake-up is underway.  It comes off the back of a diminishing presence in both the US and UK which may be difficult to recover.  The route forward remains fraught with pitfalls and uncertainty.

The direction of travel at GMU reflects the more general emerging picture for the US. Graduate enrollments look strong but as the recent IDP annual report showed interest from China looks relatively weak. As suggested in my recent blogs, the new enrollment battleground is India and with Australia back in the game and hungry it’s going to be an interesting year.

Notes

  1. The Preliminary Daily Enrollment Reports and Dashboards carry data from 19 April 2022 to 25 August 2022 (as at 25 August).  Other Enrollments Reports carry an historical record taken at a Census date in October each year.
  2. INTO Mason accepts students at a number of intake points in the year but Fall enrollment is generally the largest intake and is the sole point of reference for this blog.

Image by Joe from Pixabay 

Soft Power or Hard Facts?

NOTE: This blog was updated on 24 August to include a table and brief commentary on additional countries, specifically those in the G20, and their Government leaders. The update reinforces the key points that almost none of the leaders of the most economically powerful countries in the world studied in a higher education institution outside their own country.

The recent HEPI blog on soft power reminded me that it is easy to get stuck in a world view and to simply repeat things without questioning their validity.  It’s even worse when this results in a league table and some cheap headlines which people never interrogate for underlying validity or worth.  The HEPI chart also has some oddities, such as listing some monarchs who have extremely limited executive powers and often stand apart from political, economic or social decision making.

While some may be comforted to see the UK coming second on the HEPI measure with 55 “world leaders educated in countries other than their own” there is a need for more rigour at a point when Global Britain is the mantra/lifebelt at a time of economic gloom.  When the UK Prime Minister goes to meetings with, say, the G7 are they really amongst friends with a common and lived sense of the value of a UK higher education?  The facts suggest not.

More troubling might be that of the top 15 countries by GDP in 2022 suggests that only two country leaders have any meaningful experience of higher education outside their own country.  Three appear to have ended their studies at undergraduate/military academy level.  This is a snapshot of the world leadership in August 2022 but I suspect that the notion of a well-travelled, multi-country education is relatively rare amongst the world’s most powerful political leadership.

In a world where nationalist politics appears to have taken an increasing grip this may be a passing phase and it would be reasonable to argue that this is a small section of the global political elite.  However, some would argue that economic realities shape most political decisions and so factors shaping the leadership of the countries with economic power is worth considering.  It is always best to make an effort to understand who you are dealing with.    

Table 1: Education of Political Leaders in Top 15 Countries by GDP  

CountryNameTitleUndergradPostgrad
United StatesJoe BidenPresidentUSUS
ChinaXi JinpingPresidentChinaChina
JapanFumio KishidaPrime MinisterJapanJapan
GermanyOlaf SchulzChancellorGermanyGermany
United KingdomBoris JohnsonPrime MinisterUKUK
IndiaNarendra ModiPrime MinisterIndiaIndia*
FranceEmmanuel MacronPresidentFranceFrance
ItalyMario DraghiPrime MinisterItalyUSA
CanadaJustin TrudeauPrime MinisterCanada 
South KoreaYoon Suk-yeolPresidentS KoreaS Korea
RussiaVladimir PutinPresidentRussiaRussia
BrazilJair BolsonaroPresidentBrazil 
AustraliaAnthony AlabanesePrime MinisterAustralia 
SpainPedro SanchezPrime MinisterSpainBelgium
IndonesiaJoko WidodoPresidentIndonesia 
*contested

Adding the five additional countries that make up the G20 does not make any difference to the overall findings. The meeting in Bali in November 2022 will feature heads of government that have enjoyed almost no cross-cultural influences at higher education level. If one strength of universities is intended to be that they offer a pathway for different cultures and influences to gel and gain understanding it is a route that appears to be firmly closed for those who make it to the top of country politics.

Table 2: Leadership of Additional Countries in the G20

Notes:

  1. Information on the senior figure in the structure of a country’s “executive” leadership is taken from public sources but it is acknowledged that power structures are more complex and authority seldom wholly resides in an individual.
  2. Information on the academic qualifications is taken from public sources and has erred on the side of benevolence.  One qualification is flagged as being publicly disputed.  Where there is no entry for a higher degree level the author has found no evidence of a qualification at that level.  Any amendments are gratefully received and will be corrected.
  3. It is recognized that public profiles are often manipulated so any other authoritative corrections are also welcome.

Image by Clker-Free-Vector-Images from Pixabay 

Bread, Circuses and Clearing

Note: A data transposition error meant that a small number of Day 4 details in this blog required amendment. Deleted text is shown with a strikethrough. The changes are marginal and do not change the conclusions drawn. Amendments were made on 23 August.

Education and political commentators in the UK must salivate as they mark the A-level results date in their diary.  It’s the gift that keeps on giving as thrilled and distraught students weep real tears of joy or despair at three grade letters which will determine their immediate future.  The system places all the power in the hands of the universities as they pick and choose who to admit from the 30% or more whose predicted grades were inflated.

With that grumble about a system which is weighted heavily against students out of the way it’s time to get down to making some observations about what clearing has told us so far about international students.  It’s still early in the process and there is time for things to change but the first few days are usually telling.  The figures on day one of clearing (UCAS call it JCQ Results Day) and little change by day 4 give a sense of how the world is turning. 

The focus here is international students and that brings an immediate acknowledgement that undergraduate study is probably not where the real action lies.  However, the yearly grind of replacing PGT students is a remorseless treadmill and every university business manager should be hungry for the stability of a three year fee-paying student.  Pathway operators have also historically built their business around students who want to be undergraduates and need to improve their language skills before entering a full degree.

No Safe European Home

The near catastrophic decline in European undergraduate enrollments continues but it looks worse than the headline numbers.  Since 2019 the number of applications has fallen 54% (27,150) but on day one the number of acceptances was down 67% over the same timescale.  The slow growth in the number of acceptances suggests that there is simply not the quality of student in the pool or that they hoped to be able to slip into a highly ranked university and are not interested in trading down.

Those touting the notion that it was not financially an issue if European numbers fell steeply because they would be paying more in fees should re-evaluate their position.  In 2019 the 26,200 European students accepted on day one were worth £727m over three years at £9,250 a year.  In 2022 the 8,620 accepted on day one are worth £414m over three years at an average of, say, £16,000 a year.

Of course, some higher ranked universities will be able to charge more but it would need an average yearly undergraduate fee of £28,000 to be able to make up the difference.  It is difficult to see that this is realistic, so a net loss seems baked into the situation.  The number of acceptances is also on a downward trend year on year so getting Brexit done probably has long term consequences for higher education enrollments.

The impact on pathway operators may also have been something of a blow because many European students, particularly from less economically strong countries, needed language support.  This may be one factor behind the growing popularity of low-cost countries in attracting international students within Europe.

China In Your Hand

UK university appetite for students from China remains undimmed and it would be reasonable to lay a small bet that the Russell Group is continuing to draw in as many as possible.  What is interesting about this year is the sharp hike in the percentage of Chinese applicants who were accepted as of day one. The 42% accepted was still at that level had risen to 44.6% on day 4 of Clearing and is significantly higher than anything in the past decade (highest previous was 37.9 42.1% acceptances on day 4).

A couple of thoughts on the reasons come to mind.  It is possible that there has been a surge of quality candidates because the number of Chinese students going to the US appears to be continuing to falter.  It is also possible that pathways in the UK with international year one options are growing their degree offerings and able to provide a persuasive option to candidates at 5.5 IELTS. HESA data shows, for example, that Study Group had 1,345 Chinese undergraduate students in 2020/21.  

As of day 4 of clearing there will be some 70.9% (c5,800 5,940) more Chinese undergraduates starting UG courses in the UK in 2022 than in 2019.  

Career Opportunities

Much has been made of the ways the introduction of post-study work visas have changed the fortunes of UK universities enrolling international students.  Two key countries with rapidly growing applications were India and Nigeria.  While the bulk of candidates will have been in PGT applications both countries have seen strong UG application growth since 2019 of 217% and 91% respectively. 

There may have been high hopes pinned on these turning into enrollments but the acceptances picture tells a quite different story.  Nigeria languished at an acceptance rate of 22.7% on day one – an all time low for the past decade.  At an acceptance rate of 34.1% Indian students were marginally better than last year but at a lower level than anything else since 2013.

It would be reasonable to say that the number of accepted Nigerian students on day one has risen 106.9% since 2019.  But an extra 3,620 applicants had only yielded 620 acceptances (17%) at that point and on the same basis an extra 5,670 Indian applications brought 1,620 students (28.6%).  This might suggest why some university admissions colleagues are concerned at the propensity of aggregator platforms to attract sub-optimal candidates when, by contrast, a growth of 11,640 Chinese applicants returned 5,690 students (48.9%).

Another market touted for growth now and in the future is Pakistan, where an additional 370 applicants since 2019 saw a decline of 20 students accepted as of day one.  On a longer time scale, 2017 saw 2000 applicants from Pakistan with a day one acceptance of 540 while 2022 saw 2660 applicants with a day one acceptance of…..540.  The search for new markets and the ease of multiple application through technology may make this a recurring trend and particularly so as agents and applicants look more widely for countries with the most benevolent post-study work options.   

Minding Your P and Us

As noted, the UG trends are only part of the story and most of the excitement and expectation is in the PGT market.  If the growth in applications from India and Nigeria has been as significant as suggested by study visa data there will have been a tremendous burden on university admissions offices.  The UG picture may suggest that the vagaries of multiple applications, quality of candidates and Home Office scrutiny will result in significant inefficiency in the system for the foreseeable future.

Image by Arek Socha from Pixabay     

INTO THE OUT-DOOR?

Like most fledgling businesses, INTO University Partnerships (INTO) had some difficult moments in its early years. In March 2008,  Austin Mitchell MP raised the matter in a Parliamentary question why it had not filed financial records with Companies House and founder Andrew Colin said that the delay in submitting accounts was a “simple mistake.”  It’s not the sort of mistake you expect a £119m revenue company to be making 14 years later, so the apparent failure to file accounts on time for the joint venture with the University of East Anglia (INTO UEA llp) seems a reasonable moment for considering other possible reasons.

Companies House confirmed on 4 August that, “Upon checking the company record I can confirm that the LLP’s accounts for the period ending 31/07/2021 have not yet been received for filing at Companies House.”  This blog speculates without knowing the detail behind the late filing and it may turn out to be simply a matter of administrative failure.  Time will tell and I would be happy to provide an update if anyone with appropriate authority from the company or university contacts me with a plausible explanation.

At one end of the spectrum the failure may simply be down to bad planning and Companies House list fines starting at £150 for being a month late to £1500 for being six months over the filing deadline.  They do go on to say that “Not filing your confirmation statements, annual returns or accounts is a criminal offence – and directors or LLP designated members could be personally fined in the criminal courts.”  One would guess that it’s unlikely to get that far.

The delay does, however, raise the possibility that INTO and the University of East Anglia are in discussions about the future of the joint venture and are delaying the filing until a direction is clear.  It would require someone with appropriate accounting/auditing qualifications (which I don’t have) to fully explain the complexities of what needs to be declared in terms of timing (from balance sheet date to authorization for issue) and whether events are adjusting or non-adjusting.  Change would not, however, be unprecedented because recent history has seen INTO become 51% owners and take “significant control” of INTO Newcastle University LLP and new profit/loss sharing arrangements at INTO City LLP were noted in the 2020 accounts.

Slip Sliding Away

A previous blog noted the trajectory of INTO UEA’s student enrollments and the slide in the university’s international tuition fee revenue.  The parlous state of affairs at the joint venture was confirmed with the statement that there “will be no distribution in respect of 2020/21 nor for the next three years whilst the joint venture recovers and builds up surpluses for distribution.”  All that alongside a £7m loan guaranteed equally by both partners might be drivers of a discussion about the future.

The University’s Council meeting in October 2021 was advised by the Vice Chancellor that at that point it was falling short of recruitment targets by c1,000 students.  This might suggest that international enrollments were also not picking up and the feed through from the joint venture was not as hoped.  It all seems good fodder for the Council member who requested at the Council meeting the following month an executive summary of “what was keeping the VC awake at night.”

One other thing that might be on that list for both the University and the joint venture is that both look to be poorly positioned to seize the opportunities offered by India as the major growth market for the UK.  According to HESA data, UEA’s intake from India rose from 40 to 175 between 2016/17 and 2020/21 in a period when total Indian students in the UK rose from 16,900 to 84,555.  It is a period when UEA’s enrollment of students from China fell from 1,320 to 810.        

Winds of Change

The trail of INTO’s long term, joint venture model has been patchy and it has, arguably, not proved to be as responsive to university needs as the more traditional stand-alone pathway model.  In the UK five operational joint ventures have closed – INTO Glasgow Caledonian University (2020), INTO St Georges University (2017), INTO University of Gloucestershire (2019), INTO UEA London (2014), and INTO Newcastle London (2020).  In the US there have been closures at INTO Marshall (2019), INTO Colorado State University (2021) and INTO Washington State University (2021) as well as INTO St Louis becoming fully owned by INTO in 2021.

A recent blog noted the shift in Shorelight’s range of university relationships from joint-venture pathways oriented to direct recruitment.  INTO has not been as dynamic in making that move but the shifting sands and complexities are captured in the grid below.  This presumes that the University of East Anglia remains a joint venture pathway operation with the university.

 Joint Venture Pathway with UniversityPathways (wholly or majority owned)Direct Recruitment OnlyDirect Admit Affiliates*
US8128
UK5310
Australia1000

*Described as “American universities that offer more choices to international students who seek direct admission.”

The turbulence in international student recruitment is being felt throughout the sector and pathway operations are particularly sensitive to changes impacting the relatively small number of student that require extensive language support alongside academic study skills.  There are many examples of changing course portfolios, including International Year One, which reflect creative responses to new demands and developing visa scenarios to broaden the market for pathways.  It may be that the continuing need for flexibility brings an end to the long-term, deeply embedded, joint-venture vision that was considered by some to be an industry game-changer. 

Image by Clker-Free-Vector-Images from Pixabay